Posted by Ike Hall on 11/12/09Last updated 11/12/09
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Anthony Lewis asked me to participate in a review of the Copenhagen Treaty. His entry in the review can be found here.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
Review of Pages 113-129, by Ike Hall
119: This paragraph says that developing country parties shall (or should; they haven't decided yet) develop robust national monitoring systems for emission reductions and removals and carbon stock changes, taking into consideration the indigenous ancient knowledge and local communities.
It is this putting of the cart before the horse that should be a reason developing country parties should not ratify this treaty. In order to develop their economies, and thus improving the standard of living for their people, they need principally to concentrate on resource utilization through capital investment.
This paragraph also mentions the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA)1. SBSTA was formed by the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBT)2 to "provide the COP with advice on scientific, technological and methodological matters. Two key areas of work in this regard are promoting the development and transfer of environmentally-friendly technologies, and conducting technical work to improve the guidelines for preparing national communications and emission inventories."
For environmentally-friendly technologies to succeed, they must be developed without subsidies and must compete with freely-available alternatives, or they are not economically advantageous. Attempting to meet the carbon-emission targets without technological improvements would necessitate a fall in the standard of living, for which the populations of developed countries will not stand. Thus the treaty is inviting cheating in the emission reporting by all parties. The second part of SBSTA's assigned mission would be a point of control of private industry.
120-121: This section discusses the measurement and monitoring of REDD-plus actions. REDD is an acronym for "reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation." REDD-plus, as defined in the Bali Action Plan3, calls for:
"Policy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries".4
Interestingly, environmentalists state that there are many problems with REDD-plus from their perspective, including but not limited to:
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Failure to recognize Indigenous Peoples' rights in the UNFCCC.
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Failure to consult with Indigenous Peoples and local communities (for example in the FCPF).
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The UN definition of forests fails to differentiate between plantations and forests, meaning that companies could replace forests with monoculture tree plantations and still qualify for subsidies under REDD.
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"Technical" issues: Baselines, measurements, additionality, leakage, permanence.
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There is a serious risk of increasing corruption: in the South, where large sums of money could pour into some of the most corrupt regimes on the planet as well as in the North, where a new sub-prime market in forest carbon could be created.5
Their objections spring from a concern that REDD-plus does not actually do enough to curb carbon emissions by developed nations, assuming that carbon emissions have a negative impact. This has yet to be established. However, the above points are reasonable objections. In addition, the establishment of technocratic committees to oversee the verification process further removes the decision making from the property owners and local governments.
122-124: These paragraphs outline the steps for parties supporting the implementation of REDD-plus to document the steps they took to do so, either "through fund or market options". Clearly, carbon-trading markets are encouraged if not mandated.
125-128: These paragraphs provide details on how developing country parties get paid for complying with the Convention. The goals for developing countries are outlined as follows (emphasis added):
- Contributing to the ultimate objective of the Convention by reducing their emissions by sources and increasing removals by sinks in the forestry sector, and other selected land-use and land-use change sectors;
- Initiating efforts to embark on economy-wide low carbon development pathway, through economy-wide low carbon development plans;
- Meeting their commitments under the Convention and related legal instruments;
- Developing capacity and a reliable national framework for measurement, reporting and verification of emission reductions and removals from forestry sector and other selected land-use and land-use change sectors;
- Achieving sustainable development; and
- Conserving biological diversity.
In other words, developing country parties are expected to hamper the growth of their industries and prevent development of land and other resources in the name of biological diversity and reducing carbon emissions. One might reasonably ask, "What's the payoff for doing this?" The payoffs are discussed in the following section, but this reviewer does not believe the costs in lost development are worthwhile.
Annex III D: Enhanced action on mitigation
This section introduces the "cooperative sectoral approaches and sector-specific actions" or CSAs.
It covers the development and transfer to developing countries in specific sectors of "technologies, practices and processes that control, reduce or prevent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases" and includes "those technologies that are publicly owned or in the public domain, as well as those held by the private sector", and how such transfer is to be paid for, and the obligations of both developed and developing country parties under CSAs.
It remains to be seen whether the Convention recognizes patents or other intellectual properties in these technologies. Sectoral approaches do not relieve the compliance burden on developed country parties: "For developed country Parties, sectoral efforts may contribute to, but cannot replace, legally binding absolute emission reduction targets (QELRCs) and mitigation commitments for all Annex I Parties."
One unintentionally funny statement was this: "Sectoral approaches and sector-specific actions should be cooperative and not imposed by one Party or some Parties on other Parties." It would go without saying in a just world.
Annex III E: Enhanced action on mitigation: Economic and social consequences of response measures
This section starts with an acknowledgement that some nations, especially developing nations and the petroleum-producing and petroleum-using states, will have special social and economic impacts. It also acknowledges that many impacts will be unintended and unforeseen, and that "[m]echanisms should be developed to allow for mitigating the impact of the response measures on productive workforces, promoting a gradual and just transition in the most affected economic sectors and contributing to building new capacities for both production- and service-related jobs."
It goes on to describe the way countries should communicate the impacts of the Convention. It also proposes yet another permanent forum as a venue for "Parties to share information, experiences and views on the economic, social and environmental consequences of response measures, so as to enhance the efforts of Parties to analyse and understand these consequences and to identify innovative policy responses and technologies to address adverse consequences." Such a forum used to be called "scientific literature".
The forum also invites participation by the same climate scientists whose work has been repeatedly debunked (emphasis added):
"This permanent forum shall be open to participation by all Parties and intergovernmental organizations, and mobilize expertise from the scientific and modelling communities and the private sector."
There is an easy way for developed and developing countries to minimize the impact of the Convention: don't sign or ratify it. If a nation wishes to restrict its own carbon emissions, it is free to do so, assuming that there is such a phenomenon as anthropogenic global warming and that its impact is negative.
Annex IV: Enhanced action on the provision of financial resources and investment
Financial considerations are addressed in this section. The document decries the fact that already "financial commitments have not been met by developed country Parties" and goes on to "emphasiz[e] the urgent need for these Parties to honour their commitments."
Surely, the priorities of the developed countries have changed following the advent of the international economic crisis. But not to worry, the Convention proposes a mechanism for the provision of "new and additional, adequate and predictable financial resources":
"Developed country Parties shall provide financial resources and transfer technology to developing country Parties to make full and effective repayment of climate debt, including adaptation debt, taking responsibility for their historical cumulative emissions and current high per capita emissions."
The Catholic Church used to call this "dispensation". And what of the recipients of this largesse?
"Developing country Parties will, in pursuing economic development and poverty eradication, take proactive measures to adapt to and mitigate climate change". The central paradox of economic development while simultaneously mitigating climate change, or at least carbon emissions, could not be stated more bluntly. How, exactly, are developing country Parties supposed to pull this off? Even developed nations are struggling with this. Merely providing the technology to developing country Parties will not satisfy the needs of capital investment and property rights, upon which most of these advances in technology depend.
How are funds to be collected and distributed, and by whom?
"The financial mechanism shall operate and function under the authority, governance and guidance of, and be fully accountable to, the COP, which shall decide on its policies, programme priorities and eligibility criteria, and allocation of resources for adaptation, mitigation, technology and capacity-building and any other function that may be determined by the COP[.]"
This statement alone should cause many countries, developed and developing alike, to collectively shudder, and will hopefully make them reconsider their commitment to the Convention. For this encapsulates the creation of an unaccountable, supernational body that alone decides which developing country Parties are deserving of assistance, and in what form.
This section goes on to identify the characteristics of those particularly vulnerable developing country Parties that might qualify to be first in line: Poor developing countries; least developed countries (LDCs); small island developing states (SIDS); countries in Africa affected by drought, desertification and floods; countries with low-lying coastal, arid and semi-arid areas or areas liable to floods, drought and desertification; archipelagic countries; developing countries with fragile mountainous ecosystems; countries with unique biodiversity, tropical glaciers and fragile ecosystems; particularly vulnerable populations, groups and communities, especially the poor, women, children, the elderly, indigenous peoples, minorities and those suffering from disability.
In other words, the usual intended recipients of international aid. History is replete with examples of how such transfers of wealth have operated poorly and counterproductively in the past.
1 http://www.cbd.int/sbstta/
2 http://www.cbd.int/
3 http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_13/application/pdf/cp_bali_action.pdf
4 http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/cop13/eng/06a01.pdf
5 http://www.redd-monitor.org/redd-an-introduction/
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