By Doug Bandow View all 13 articles by Doug Bandow Published 09/08/09  
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Adm. Timothy Keating, the U.S. commander in the Asia-Pacific, recently said: "We are prepared to execute a wide range of options in concert with allies in South Korea" against North Korea, if necessary. Being prepared is good, I suppose. But why are "we" preparing military contingencies involving South Korea? Shouldn't that be Seoul's job? The interventionist impulse is deeply ingrained in American foreign policy. In the aftermath of World War II, the U.S. saw itself as the only barrier to Soviet expansion. In East Asia, both China and North Korea loomed as significant military threats; various communist insurgencies added anxiety. But that world disappeared long ago. There's no longer a Soviet Union or Warsaw Pact. Maoist China is filled with capitalists. Vietnam, America's greatest Cold War "loss," has sidled up to the West. The Khmer Rouge is long gone. The so-called Democratic People's Republic of Korea remains with us, but is a decrepit economic wreck. On the other side, America's friends have grown wealthy. Europe has more than ten times Russia's GDP. In East Asia economic prosperity has leaped from Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea to an increasing number of smaller "tigers." India has awakened, and the world's largest democracy leans against China. The balance of power has shifted dramatically as the old-time communist religion has essentially disappeared. Nevertheless, U.S. policymakers assume that America must continue to do the heavy lifting when it comes to security. Explained Adm. Keating: "I can tell you that we have plans with the United States Forces-Korea and others in place if the president tells us to execute those plans, in the event of some uncertain succession in the North." Gen. Walter Sharp, the top U.S. commander in South Korea, recently opined that American and South Korean forces are ready for "anything North Korea can throw at us." Washington policymakers intend to get involved in the Korean peninsula even if North Korea collapses. The Council on Foreign Relations recently published a detailed report which worried that policing the North "would place a significant strain on South Korea, particularly in view of the current plan to reduce its army by some 30 percent over the next decade." Since Seoul wants to do less, American soldiers and taxpayers would be expected to kick in. U.S. forces, argued the Council: "could provide vital assistance in the form of transportation services, command, control, communications and intelligence infrastructure, the distribution of humanitarian supplies, and the repatriation of refugees." Of course, that presumes no resistance by North Koreans. In that case "the needed stabilization force would escalate dramatically." And you can guess who would be on the hook for providing those extra personnel. The Council even worries that coping with an active insurgency "would likely impossible for the South Korean and American forces to manage alone." Remind me again why the Republic of Korea plans on cutting its forces by nearly one-third? America's military support for the ROK grew out of the post-World War II division of the Korean peninsula. The DPRK was backed by both Maoist China and the U.S.S.R., while the U.S. denied heavy weapons to South Korea's jingoistic President Syngman Rhee. For years only America's security guarantee and troop presence stopped Pyongyang from trying again. But those days are long behind us. North Korea possesses a lot of military personnel and hardware: 1.1 million personnel, over 4000 tanks, 2500 armored personnel carriers, and 18,000 pieces of artillery. But its forces are ill-trained and its weapons are antiquated. The terrain favors defense and neither China nor Russia would back the North in an invasion. The ROK lags behind in quantity, but that is a matter choice. There is no immutable aspect of geography which requires the country to the south to have a smaller military than the country to the north. Rather, South Korea has chosen to rely on America in order to invest its money on economic development. A perfectly rational decision for Seoul. But perfectly ridiculous for America today, when the South has upwards of 40 times the GDP and twice the population of the DPRK. South Korea is capable of building a much larger military, adding rather than cutting military personnel. It has decided to build one significantly smaller than that of the North because it can count on Americans rushing to its defense. Not only that, but Seoul has spent much of the last decade subsidizing North Korea with cash, food, and investment as part of its "sunshine policy." Despite Pyongyang's ever-belligerent rhetoric, most South Koreans do not fear attack. Even now, under the conservative government of President Lee Myung-bak, the ROK is reducing the size of its armed forces rather than bolstering the military in preparation for whatever might come during North Korea's looming leadership transition. And, as usual, South Koreans are expecting Americans to pick up the slack. The ROK is an independent nation fully entitled to implement its own foreign policy and create its own military force. But the core duty of an independent nation is to defend itself. Having joined the ranks of leading countries -- South Korea's economy ranks in the top 15 -- Seoul should take over responsibility for ensuring its own defense as well as promoting regional stability. The U.S. can and should be a good friend of the South, as Americans expand cultural, economic, and political ties with South Koreans. But it's time to plan for a phase-out of America's troop presence, punctuated by ending America's security guarantee. The two governments should continue to cooperate on security issues of shared interest, of which there are many. However, they should work together as equals, not as guardian and dependent. Put bluntly, Americans should no longer be expected to subsidize their friends across the Pacific. Copyright © 2009 Campaign for Liberty |
Also by Doug Bandow:
What to Do with China? 01/26/10
Abandoning the Interventionist Temptation in Afghanistan 12/28/09
Constitutional Crisis in Honduras -- Who Cares? 11/11/09
Alliances as Transmission Belts of War 10/21/09
Ukrainian Follies: Creating More Needless Defense Dependents 08/05/09
View all 13 articles by Doug Bandow
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